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Prescriptive Jurisdiction over Internet Activity:
The Need to Define and Establish
the Boundaries of Cyberliberty
SAMUEL F. MILLER*
INTRODUCTION
Globalization occurs at the nexus of politics, culture, technology, finance,
national security, and ecology.' "Globalization" refers to the increasingly "com-
plex, dynamic legal and social processes" occurring throughout the world.2 It is
the development of a global mindset that challenges the traditional political, so-
cial, and economic characteristics of nations and has led to the "deterritorializa-
tion and reterritorialization of [vast] policy spaces."3 Many of the changes and
challenges attributed to globalization rely on the exchange of information
throughout the world, making "the flow of ideas across national borders" a key
agent of globalization.4 Due to the increasing availability of personal computers
and software, the Internet provides the ideal forum for information transfer.'
The Internet engenders "the notion of distributed power: decentraliza-
tion, openness, possibility of expansion, no hierarchy, no center, no conditions
for authoritarian or monopoly control."6 The Internet has become vital to the
* B.A., 2000, Xavier University; J.D., 2003, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
I would like to thank my parents, Shirley and Russell Miller, for their support and Professor
Hannah Buxbaum of the Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington for her advice and
guidance in the preparation of this note.
1. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LExUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 21 (1999).
2. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Introduction, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (1993).
3. Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart, Coping With Globalization: An Introduction, in COPING
WITH GLOBALIZATION 1, 3 (Aseem Prakash & Jeffrey A. Hart eds., 2000).
4. Id. at 3.
5. "Flows of money, goods and people are accelerated by the various technologies in use, par-
ticularly those from within the telecommunications sector." BARRIE AXFORD, THE GLOBAL SYSTEM
109 (1995).
6. SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 177 (1998).
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broader dynamics of organizing global society, "both economically and
politically."
7
One of the vital aspects of organizing global society has been individual lib-
erty. With the introduction of the Internet, traditional notions of liberty are chal-
lenged. The global reach of information transfer requires examining liberty in
its new form-"cyberliberty." Cyberliberty expands across all borders, affects all
nations, and as of yet, has not been defined by any nation. This note recommends
a definition of cyberliberty in order to provide a legal foundation for regulating
conduct on the Internet. The definition is predicated upon freedom from the
control and influence of states through their assertion of prescriptive jurisdic-
tion, a liberty that has always been an essential element of sovereignty.'
Part I briefly describes how traditional international law principles of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction have been applied to activities on the Internet. It then iden-
tifies some limits to these methods that arise from the unique characteristics of
the Internet. Part II surveys philosophic conceptions of liberty, recognizing the
implications of liberty on the Internet, and recommends a definition of cyberlib-
erty that favors expansive liberty and clear expectations for Internet actors.
I. PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION OVER INTERNET ACTIVITY
Despite the unique quality of the Internet as a key agent of globalization,
and some scholarly arguments that the Internet should not be regulated under
traditional standards,9 jurisdiction over Internet-related activity is still generally
tested under international jurisdictional law.'" Jurisdiction exists in three forms:
7. Id. at 191; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., argues that "the Internet and other forces of globalization
are eroding traditional institutions of sovereignty." HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., LAW AND THE INFOR-
MATION SUPERHIGHWAY § 14.18 (2000). He points out that some criticism of the Internet as a posi-
tive force of globalization does exist and avoids the criticism of wearing "rose colored glasses"
when discussing globalization and the Internet. Id.
8. See S.S. "Lotus" Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18-19, available at http'//
www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/cases/lotus.htm [hereinafter Lotus].
9. Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996) (citing David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367,
1387-91 (1996)).
10. See generally Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace:
Which States May Regulate the Internet?, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 117 (1997).
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jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate, and to enforce." The primary jurisdic-
tional problem that arises in relation to the Internet as a platform of globaliza-
tion is one of prescriptive jurisdiction. It is the application of a single state's laws
to Internet content that gives rise to complication. For example, may State A
prohibit citizens of State B, located in State B, from posting advertisements for
purple farm tractors on the Internet simply because State A prohibits the sale of
purple farm tractors? Questions of this sort have strong implications for the glo-
bal character of the Internet.
A firm basis for jurisdiction to prescribe is required to justify the infringe-
ment of sovereignty that would accompany regulation of Internet content. As
stated in the Permanent Court of International Justice's opinion in the Lotus
case, "a state ... may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another
state," and jurisdiction "cannot be exercised by a state outside its territory except
by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a con-
vention."12 As the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York
has noted,
The Internet is a worldwide phenomenon, accessible from every
corner of the globe. [A defendant] cannot be prohibited from op-
erating its Internet site merely because the site is accessible from
within one country in which its product is banned. To hold other-
wise would be tantamount to a declaration that this Court and
every other court throughout the world, may assert jurisdiction
over all information providers on the global World Wide Web. 3
A. Traditional Bases for Prescriptive Jurisdiction
International law recognizes five sources of prescriptive jurisdiction: the na-
tionality principle, the subjective territoriality principle, the objective territoriality
11. See Asaad Siddiqi, Welcome to the City of Bytes? An Assessment of the Traditional Methods
Employed in the International Application of Jurisdiction over Internet Activities-Including a
Critique of Suggested Approaches, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 43, 61-64 (2001).
12. Lotus, supra note 8, at 18-19. The Lotus case elucidates many of the foundations for interna-
tional jurisdiction that are now recognized as general principles of international law.
13. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 E Supp. 1032, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(quoting defendant's brief). But see Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in
Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 591-92 (1997).
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principle, the protective principle, and the universal jurisdiction principle. 4 Only
the nationality principle and the two territoriality principles can be, or have been,
applied to the regulation of Internet information transfers. 5
1. The Nationality Principle
The nationality principle has been described as supporting the jurisdiction
of a nation to prescribe law "with respect to... the activities, interests, status, or
relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory."' 6 This principle is
based on the assumption that a person grants the country of which he is a
national the right to regulate his conduct, no matter where located. 7 This prin-
ciple is uncontroversial in international law.'8
2. The Subjective Territoriality Principle
Often referred to as the subjective territoriality doctrine, the ability of sov-
ereign states to exercise jurisdiction over property, persons, acts or occurrences
within their own territory is a fundamental principle of international law.'9 The
Peace of Westphalia strengthened the notion of sovereignty of the nation state
and specifically, the state right of territorial integrity.20 Jurisdiction within a
14. J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 202-35 (10th ed. 1989).
15. Under the protective principle, jurisdiction is invoked when a state proves that a threat to
national security has occurred. See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law, 66 TEx. L. REV. 785, 787-88 (1988). Universal jurisdiction grants jurisdiction over a limited
number of offenses, such as terrorism, that are recognized as those of universal concern without
regard to the location of the offense or nationalities of offender or offended. Id. at 788; see also
Maria del Carmen M~irquez Carrasco & Joaquin Alcaide Fernindez, In Re Pinochet, 93 Am. J.
INT'L. L. 960 (1999) (reviewing a case from Spanish courts). The ongoing discussion on informa-
tion warfare may give rise to universal jurisdiction for Internet activity, but at the current time, no
law or case exists on this point. For a discussion on information warfare, see generally Mark R.
Shulman, Discrimination in the Laws of Information Warfare, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 939
(1999).
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403(c)(2) (1986).
17. Cf Wilske & Schillersupra note 10, at I3i (explaining the uncontroversial nature of regulat-
ing the conduct of a state's nationals anywhere in the world under the nationality principle).
18. This principle is based on the traditional "social contract" idea under which one exchanges
complete freedom of action for protection and security. See infra Part II.A.
19. STARKE, SUpra note 14, at 205.
20. See M.E. Bowman, Is International Law Ready for the Information Age?, 19 FORD-AM INT'L
L.J. 1935, 1935 n.l (1996).
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state's territory is fundamental to the sovereignty of all nations. 2 It has been
said,
It is an essential attribute of the sovereignty of this realm, as of all
sovereign independent States, that it should possess jurisdiction
over all persons and things within its territorial limits and in all
causes civil and criminal arising within these limits.
22
The Westphalian-based territoriality principle has been accepted as custom-
ary international law and reaffirmed in documents such as the Montevideo Con-
vention on the Rights and Duties of States23 and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations.24
3. The Objective Territoriality Principle
In recent years, the principle of jurisdiction based on territoriality has been
expanded beyond the traditional bounds of the subjective territoriality doctrine.
Under the objective territoriality principle, the territorial basis of jurisdiction
has in some cases been expanded to encompass actions that, although not occur-
ring within a state's territory, have actual or intended effects within that state's
territory." It is generally recognized that the action must have a sufficiently
strong link to the state's territory in order to justify jurisdiction.26 In addition,
the effect must be "direct, foreseeable, and substantial" within the territory.
27
Even if the effect of the action is "direct, foreseeable, and substantial," the
objective territoriality principle is limited to uses that do not violate the notion of
21. See STARKE, SUpra note 14, 202-34.
22. Id. at 202 (quoting Compania Naviera Vascongado v. Cristina SS, 11938] AC 485, 496-97
(U.K.)).
23. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, T.S. No. 881,165 L.N.T.S. 19
("[Tlhe jurisdiction of States within the limits of national territory applies to all the inhabitants.").
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402(l)(a) ("[A] state has jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to conduct that wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory.").
25. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (1945); cf. United States v.
Thomas, 113 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1997).
26. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 475-76 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1955).
27. Case 89/85, Osakeyhtio v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5212 [hereinafter Re Wood Pulp
Cartel].
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sovereignty protected by international law.2" In general, a state is subject to lim-
itations on its authority to exercise jurisdiction in cases that involve foreign in-
terests or activities."9 "The scope of a state's sovereignty is, therefore limited and
defined by the reaches of another state's sovereignty."" It has been suggested that
every state has an obligation to exercise moderation and restraint in cases re-
garding a foreign element in order to avoid undue encroachment on jurisdiction
of other states.3 Jurisdiction under the objective territoriality principle may only
be found when the claiming state does not act "in a manner which is contrary to
the laws or national interests" of other states.32
As some commentators have noted, the "effects" doctrine as applied by the
United States has been rejected by United Kingdom, Australia, and other coun-
tries. These countries often adopt local legislation to counter the assertion of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction on this basis. Nonetheless, some of these countries have
implicitly accepted the doctrine in such cases as Wood Pulp. In Wood Pulp, the
European Commission successfully filed anti-competition suits against several
U.S., Canadian, and European wood product producers that had formed a cartel
outside the European Union, but whose strategies were implemented there."
4. A Possible Alternative: The Internet as Its Own Territory
One important alternative to current prescriptive jurisdictional schemes is
to consider the Internet as a territory unto itself. This approach attempts to ob-
viate the problem of states infringing on the sovereignty of each other by divorc-
ing the Internet from national laws, and instead applying a separate body of law
(or no law) particularly appropriate to the Internet. David R. Johnson and David
G. Post, noted proponents of the Internet as a unique territory, once stated,
Many of the jurisdictional and substantive quandaries raised by
border-crossing electronic communications could be resolved by
28. Wilske & Schiller, supra note 10, at 146.
29. PHILIP C. JESSup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 97-99 (1950).
30. Joshua S. Bauchner, State Sovereignty and the Globalizing Effects of the Internet: A Case Study
of the Privacy Debate, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 689, 692-93 (2000).
31. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 105.
32. Re Wood Pulp Cartel, supra note 27, at 5213.
33. Id.
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one simple principle: conceiving of cyberspace as a distinct "place"
for purpose[s] of legal analysis and recognizing a legally signifi-
cant border between cyberspace [and] the "real world." ... Cross-
ing into cyberspace is a meaningful act that would make
application of a distinct law of cyberspace fair to those who pass
over the electronic boundary.
34
Internet theorists such as Johnson and Post (and perhaps the majority of In-
ternet users), saw the Internet in its early "romantic era" as a world unto itself.35
The "romantic era" embraced the vision of the Internet as a realm where
humans live, not in physical form, but rather in virtual form. Further, in cyber-
space, people would have experiences just as they would in any physical terri-
tory.36 The far-reaching nature of the Internet enables people to discover new
things, meet new people, form relationships, engage in activities and discussion,
and, although it is a stretch of imagination, engage in physical activities as a vir-
tual person through role-playing or other video games. These people "meet,
talk, and live in cyberspace in ways not possible in real space."
'3 7
The primary difference between this virtual territory and any other terri-
tory is the intangible nature of the Internet.38 It does not exist in any one terri-
tory, nation, or state. Some would argue that it exists in every state, advancing
the argument that, by existing in all states, the Internet maintains such a large
territory that a "neoterritory" is formed, whose governance requires a unique set
of rules. In essence, cyberspace should have its own "cyberlaw."39 As Yaman
Akdeniz stated, "The Internet is a complex, anarchic, and multi-national
34. David R. Johnson & David G. Post, The Rise of Law on the Global Network, in BORDERS IN
CYBERSPACE 3, 12-14 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997).
35. Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice and Privacy: International Choice of Law and the Internet,
32 INT'L LAW. 991 (1998).
36. Lessig, supra note 9, at 1403. See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY:
HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (2000), available at http'//www.rheingold.com/vc/
book/ intro.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
37. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1746 (1995).
38. See Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1387.
39. Lessig agrees that a separate law might solve some of the jurisdictional problems, but is
skeptical of Johnson and Post's romantic notions of a picturesque cyberspace. Furthermore, he
believes that software code (e.g., passwords and encryption to prevent trespass or copyright
infringement) would be a more efficient way of regulating the Internet than a form of"cyberlaw."
See Lessig, supra note 9, at 1407.
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environment where old concepts of regulation, reliant as they are upon tangibil-
ity in time and space, may not be easily applicable or enforceable. 40
While thinking of the Internet as a unique and independent territory deserv-
ing of its own laws and free from the laws of nations would solve many jurisdic-
tional problems, this idea suffers two flaws. First, the Internet is not in fact
independent. The intangible Internet requires the tangible. The Internet cannot
exist without the human element. Somewhere someone is physically writing the
code necessary for the Internet to operate. The Internet is not in fact some ethereal
body beyond the physical. As it is part of the physical realm, it must have a physical
location, however difficult this may be to place. Thus, the idea of the Internet as a
unique and independent territory on some separate territorial plane is false.
Second, nations have already passed laws regulating the Internet,4 demon-
strating their rejection of the notion that the Internet and cyberspace are beyond
the grasp of governmental powers. The United States has enacted the Digital
Millenium Copyright Act, and attempted to adopt two Children's Decency
Acts. 42 Germany has enacted the German Information and Communications
Services Act.43 France has attempted to apply general censorship laws to the
Internet as well. The actions of these influential nations will likely attract the
notice of other nations that will also create Internet-related legislation.
In the end, the analysis of the Internet as its own territory fails to solve the
regulatory problem. The Internet is not a separate and individual territory. In
recognition of this, states and courts have already sought to analyze Internet reg-
ulation using traditional theories of prescriptive jurisdiction.
40. Yaman Akdeniz, Governance of Pornogaphy and Child Pornography on the Global Internet: A
Multi-Layered Approach, in LAW AND THE INTERNET: REGULATING CYBERSPACE 223, 225 (Lilian
Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 1997).
41. Another related problem especially prevalent in the idea of cyberlaw, is enforcement. How
exactly does one enforce cyberlaw against an actor in cyberspace? Is there a "cyberprison" for con-
sistent violators? Is this simply another argument that the Internet requires a connection with the
physical world ?
42. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 1201-03, 112 Stat. 2860,
2862-76 (1998).
43. See Entwurf eines Gesetz zur Regelung der Rahmenbedingungen fur Informations und
Kommunikationsdienste [Federal Act Establishing the General Conditions for Information and
Communication Services] (IuKDG) (1996) (Ger.), available at http://www.iid.de/rahmen/
iukdgebt.html [hereinafter Information and Communication Services Act].
234
PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION OVER INTERNET ACTIVITY
B. Problems with assertion of Prescriptive Jurisdiction over Internet Activity
Two primary problems arise in the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction over
the Internet. First, what location is relevant under the subjective territoriality
principle? Second, how does the element of intent for jurisdiction under the ob-
jective territoriality principle apply to passive websites? This section will first
present these two issues generally and then use several cases to illustrate the spe-
cific harms that can result.
1. The Locus Problem: Determining Location for Subjective Territoriality
Jurisdiction
As discussed earlier, states have always relied on the ability to exercise juris-
diction over property, persons, acts or occurrences within their sovereign bor-
ders.44 The fundamental complexity of applying the subjective territory
principle to the Internet can be summarized in one seemingly simple question:
in which territory is the Internet action in question located? Jane Ginsburg sug-
gests that proliferation of information on the Internet nearly equates to a "simul-
taneous publication ... in every country of the world in which there is Internet
access."4 As she points out, then, there are many answers to this question. 46
One approach to the problem would be to consider the location of the Inter-
net viewer as the location for purposes of subjective territoriality. 47 For a nation
concerned with what is being shown or purchased through the Internet, this
seems to be the logical solution. The action of viewing or purchasing occurs
within its territory and therefore the nation must have a right to regulate. While
initially this solution appears to be consistent with the notion of sovereignty, in
fact, it is not. This approach to jurisdiction would fall within the "simultaneous
publication" dilemma. For example, one nation's censorship of materials on the
Internet might clash with the legal viewing and dissemination of the same ma-
terials in another country. Therefore, basing jurisdiction on the location of the
Internet viewer is an incomplete approach.
44. STARKE, supra note 14, at 202-35.
45. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Private International Law of Copyright in an Era of Technological
Change, 273 RECUEIL DES COURs 239, 255 (1998).
46. See generally id.
47. Id. at 285. "[The] work is not yet available to the public until it arrives at its palace of resi-
dence on the website that members of the public will access." Id. at 269.
SAMUEL F. MILLER
A second approach would be to consider the location of the author, creator,
or greatest number of creators of the website as the proper location to apply sub-
jective territoriality.48 However, this approach falls within the fails to answer
completely the original question of location, because, like the first approach, it
falls within the "simultaneous publication" dilemma. While an author may be
located in a single nation, the website is made available everywhere. The web-
site's content may be legal where it was written or entered into the Internet but
illegal in one or more of the nations where it is viewed. The second approach is
thus incomplete in a way similar to the first approach.
A third approach would be to apply the subjective territoriality principle
based only on where the server is located, as creating a website or posting mes-
sages on the Internet requires storing-or at a minimum, transferring-the in-
formation through a central server.49 However, Jane Ginsburg posits that this
theory would not solve many of the territorial complexities with jurisdiction. 50
The notion that the location of the server can serve as location of jurisdiction
may be easily circumvented. Two theoretical situations serve as examples. In to-
day's world of increasingly mobile technology, a server might be located on a
ship or some other mobile unit.5 ' Alternatively, the location of the server may be
circumvented by using phone lines to send information through several
countries and several sub-servers, creating the additional problem of determin-
ing the primary server. Thus, the location of the server proves to be of little use
in developing the subjective territoriality doctrine.52
Another approach is to consider the location where the website was first lo-
calized. A website address begins as an Internet protocol (IP) address, analogous
to a street address for a house or business. An IP address can then be translated
by one of several private registrars into an easy-to-use domain name, which is a
48. Id. at 270 .
49. Id. at 269-70.
50. Id.
51. The mobile server is well within the realm of reality and has even made headlines in the
television series ALIAS. See ALIAS: "Phase One", Season 2-Episode 13 (ABC Television broad-
cast, Jan. 26, 2003), synopsis available at http://www.abc.abcnews.go.com/primetime/alias/
missions/episode213a.html.
52. Moreover, the person downloading the website may have no knowledge of the location of
the website. This brings to the forefront the question whether intent is needed for application of
jurisdiction, which will be discussed in the section to follow. See infra Part I.B.2; see also, e.g.,Gins-
burg, supra note 45, at 270.
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string of letters in the form of a keyword or mnemonic device 53 (e.g.,
www.boxes.com). Many domain names include a geographic suffix, called a
country code top level domain (e.g., ".uk" for the United Kingdom or ".jp" for
Japan).54 Policies and regulations regarding these suffixes vary, but generally
these suffixes are reserved for citizens of the countries they indicate.55 While IP
addresses or domain names do not solve the problem of territorial location com-
pletely, they may potentially provide proof of location. Therefore, nations might
apply the subjective territorial doctrine based on the domain name.
2. Passive Web Sites vs. Interactive Web Sites: The Question of Intent in
Objective Territoriality
One essential problem with the objective territoriality doctrine as applied to
the Internet is the question of intent. In short, this question can be framed as the
"intended or stumbled upon" quandary. For example, if a person in country A
posts pictures of her collection of purple tractors on her website, can country B,
which outlaws the display of purple tractors, assert jurisdiction over the person
based on the claim that there was an intended effect of encouraging the viewing
of purple tractors? In other words, is there a difference between passive and ac-
tive use of the Internet? In this case, country B applies jurisdiction based on the
alleged intent to cause harm, but the individual actor merely posted the pictures
on her website, which made them available to people whose nations' laws pro-
hibit them from viewing the pictures. A vital question, then, is whose intent con-
trols. Does the publisher's intent to make the pictures available to everyone
everywhere constitute intent to cause an effect that would allow application of
jurisdiction everywhere? Or does the viewer's intent to open the webpage con-
stitute the intent to cause an effect necessary under objective territoriality?
53. InterNIC FAQs on the Domain Names, Registrars, and Registration,at http://www.internic.net
faqs/domain-names.html (last visited Apr. 9,2003). These registrars register domain names in ex-
change for the registrant's name, contact information, and a fee. Top-level domain registrars
(those who grant .com, .biz, .net, .ogr, .name, .info domain names) are collectively governed by the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN is a non-profit cor-
poration that "is assuming responsibility from the U.S. Government for coordinating certain In-
ternet technical functions, including the management of [the] Internet domain name system." Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Various U.S. courts have condoned the rationale of California Software, Inc.
v. Reliability Research, Inc.,56 which held that a posting on the Internet purposely
intended to cause harm may be enough to justify jurisdiction when there exists
a reasonably strong interest in protecting the rights of a state's citizens. 7 Some
commentators have recommended further that the intent requirement be ex-
tended to cover passive postings on a website that cause harm as well.5"
3. Selected Cases
The cases below illustrate the complexity of tailoring existing jurisdictional
rules to Internet regulation; further, they reveal the impact that such regulation
may have on individual liberty.
a. CompuServe Cases
In 1997, Germany passed the German Information and Communications
Services Act.59 Among other provisions intended to restrict content of the Inter-
net, the Act established a type of conduit liability for internet service providers
(ISPs). Under the Act, ISPs had a duty to block and make unavailable materials
found to be illegal under the Act.6' The Act provided that the ISPs only had such
a duty when knowledge of the illegal material existed.6 However, failure to re-
move or block the material after it was discovered would result in criminal pros-
ecution. 62 In addition, the Act called for independent monitoring of materials
that might be deemed harmful to minors.6
3
56. 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
57. See, e.g., Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 E2d 1191 (9th Cir. Cal. 1988); Maritz, Inc. v.
Cybergold, Inc., 947 E Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Claude P. Bamberger Int'l v. Robin & Haas
Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22110 (D.N.J. 1996); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2065 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
58. W.S. Gale, The Impact of Information Technology upon Civil Practice and Procedure, in LAW &
THE INTERNET: REGULATING CY1ERSPACE 245, 248-49 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds.,
1997).
59. See Information and Communication Services Act,supra note 43.
60. Amber Jene Sayle, Net Nation and the Digital Revolution: Regulation of Offensive Materialfor
a New Community, 18 Wis. INT'L L.J. 257, 268-69 (2000).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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On December 8,1995, German authorities delivered to CompuServe, Inc., a
U.S.-based entity with an office in Germany, a list of 280 newsgroups that the
German authorities believed violated German anti-pornography laws and con-
tained material "harmful to minors."64 CompuServe was located within the
United States and provided access through its servers located there.
CompuServe argued that the software required to filter the prohibited materials
was unavailable without subsequently barring U.S. citizens from the same ma-
terial." The matter was ultimately resolved outside of court, and to avoid crim-
inal prosecution, CompuServe agreed to the demands of German authorities.
The result of CompuServe's concession was globally blocking the prohibited
newsgroups from its service, 66 thereby barring 4.3 million subscribers world-
wide from access to over 200 sexually explicit discussion groups that would
potentially violate German laws.
67
b. The Yahoo! Cases
These cases stem from the sale of Nazi paraphernalia on Yahoo!'s online
auction site. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme (LICRA) and
L'Union des Etudiants Juifs de France (L'Union), two non-profit organizations
of French citizens, sought to prohibit Yahoo!, Inc., a business incorporated in the
United States and maintaining it's primary place of business in the United
States, from allowing Nazi paraphernalia to be sold on Yahoo!'s auction sites.
LICRA and L'Union claimed that availability of the paraphernalia violated
Article R645-1 of the French Criminal Code. 68 Article R645-1 prohibits the sale
64. Id. at 271.
65. John Markoff, German Pornography Law Determines What America Sees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31, 1995, at H2.
66. John T. Delacourt, Recent Development: The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 38
HARV. INT'L L.J. 207, 212 (997). Despite CompuServe's agreement to block prohibited news-
groups, the German court still convicted Felix Somm, the manager of CompuServe's German
subsidiary, for violating the statute and thereby punished the manager of a subsidiary for a parent
company's actions. Somm's conviction, however, was overturned in 1999. See Sayle, supra note 60,
at 271-72. CompuServe's agreement to block was opposed by groups throughout the world, such
as many Canadians who canceled their service in protest. EFC's Registry of Canadians Opposed to
CompuServe Censorship, at http://www.efc.ca/pages/cis/ registry.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003)
[hereinafter EFC's Registry of Canadians].
67. See Sayle,supra note 60, at 271.
68. C. PAN. art. 645-1.
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of any Nazi propaganda or artifact.69 LICRA and L'Union brought their claim
before the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris ("the Paris Court"); subse-
quently, Yahoo! Sought in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California a declaration that any resulting judgment of the French court would
not be enforced in the United States.7°
In the case before the Paris Court, LICRA and L'Union successfully argued
(1) that France had jurisdiction over the Yahoo! actions on the Internet, and (2)
that by making Nazi paraphernalia available on the Internet, and directing the
auction to French citizens through the use of a French subsidiary, Yahoo! vio-
lated the ban on the sale of such material.7' Yahoo! countered that it was unable
accurately to ascertain the geographic location of Yahoo! Users, and therefore,
that France lacked jurisdiction. The Paris Court held that France could right-
fully prohibit Yahoo!'s ability to post the materials based on French law and the
morals and sensibilities of "democratic states. 72 As a result, the Paris Court or-
dered Yahoo! to prevent French citizens from accessing illegal material, includ-
ing web pages on Yahoo.com (an American website) that contained "text,
extracts or quotations from Mein Kampf and Protocol of the Elders of Zion."73
In addition, the Paris Court ordered Yahoo! to post a warning on Yahoo.fr to
French citizens stating that any search for illegal Nazi paraphernalia might sub-ject the citizen to criminal prosecution.74 Finally, the Court ordered Yahoo! to
"remove from all browser directories accessible in the French Republic index
headings entitled 'negationists' and from all hypertext links the equation of
'negationists' under the heading Holocaust. '75 Moreover, it indicated that failure
by Yahoo! to comply with the order of the Paris Court would result in substan-
tial monetary penalties being levied against Yahoo!.76
69. Id.
70. Yaman Akdeniz, Case Analysis of League Against Racism and Antisemitism (LICRA), French
Union offewish Students v. Yahoo! Inc. (U.S.A.), Yahoo France, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris,
Interim Court Order, 20 November 2000, 1 ELEc. Bus. L. ReP. 110 (2001), at http://www.cyber-
rights.org/ documents/yahoo ya.pdf.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1184
(N.D. Cal. 2001).
74. Id. at 1184.
75. Id. at 1184-85.
76. Id. at 1185.
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In Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme,77 the Dis-
trict Court, however, declared that the French order was unenforceable in the
United States. The Court held that while France has the sovereign right to reg-
ulate speech within its borders, a U.S. court may not enforce a foreign order that
chills protected free speech. The Court recognized the conflicts inherent in post-
ing speech on the Internet because such a posting "allows one to speak in more
than one place at the same time," but stated that the French regulations "clearly
would be inconsistent with the First Amendment if mandated by a court in the
United States." Moreover, the Court stated that the interest in protecting free
speech outweighs the traditional respect for comity. 79
c. The Google Case
CompuServe, Inc. and Yahoo! are not the only parties to experience the
reach of foreign laws over their actions on the Internet. Recently, Google, Inc.
found that the government of the Republic of China blocked Chinese citizens'
access to Google.com and, further, redirected the citizens to Chinese
government-controlled web sites.8" Google.com provides access to the largest
search engine on the World Wide Web: an "index comprising more than 3 bil-
lion URLs."' While no criminal charges were filed or any legal action taken by
China against the company, Google, Inc. was forced to spend substantial time
negotiating with the Chinese government in order to be freed of government
censorship. 2
d. Le Grand Secret
In another case, the owner of an Internet caf6 in France made available via
website a copy of Le Grant Secret, an unauthorized biography documenting the
life of French President Francois Mitterrand." Due to pressure from Mitterrand's
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1192.
79. Id. at 1192-93.
80. Jason Krause, Casting a Wide 'Net: Search Engines Yahoo and Google Tussle with Foreign
Courts Over Content, 88 A.B.A J. 20 (2002).
81. Google, Inc. Fact Sheet, at http://www.google.com/press/facts.htmi.
82. Krause, supra note 80.
83. Ginsburg, supra note 45, at 253.
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family, the French court ordered that all the copies of this book be removed from
shelves throughout the country.84 The owner of the Internet caf6 was able to copy
the book and place it on the Internet before all books were forced to be returned.85
When threatened with legal action by the Mitterrand family, the owner re-
sponded that he would delete the files from his server and transfer them to a server
in the United States.86 Apparently, the owner did eventually send the files to the
United States and several websites carry the book in digital form. However, the
website that tends to be listed first by search engines has been replaced with a state-
ment that the website has been closed due to potential legal action.8 7
II. PROTECTING LIBERTY ON THE INTERNET: THE NEED TO DEFINE
CYBERLIBERTY AND ITs LIMITATIONS
For nearly a decade, legal scholarship has focused on rationalizing and jus-
tifying jurisdictional schemes to control the Internet.8 While attempting to con-
trol the spread of unpopular political expression, pornography, e-commerce,
89
and, most recently, terrorism on the World Wide Web, states have failed to
recognize one of the important philosophical cornerstones of this new post-
Westphalian dimension.9" In the hurried actions of states to gain control of a
space without a defined territory, they have attempted the impossible: to control
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. "This web page has been removed due to threats of legal action by persons claiming to rep-
resent the authors of the book which was censored in France. While I do not believe their protes-
tations of only being concerned about intellectual property rights, I do not have either the time or
the reSourceS to fight offa legal action." Le Grand Secret, at http://www.daft.com/- rab/libertyAe-
secret (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
88. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 20, at 1935; Michael L. Siegel, Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and the
Internet: The Jurisdictional and Human Rights Nightmare, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 375 (1999); Eric
J. Bakewell et al., Computer Crimes, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 481 (2001). For a discussion of interna-
tional jurisdictional problems more generally, see, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Universal Interna-
tional Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993); Christopher L. Blakesley & Otto Lagodny, Finding
Harmony Amidst Disagreement Over Extradition, Jurisdiction, the Role of Human Rights, and Issues of
Extraterritoriality under International Criminal Law, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1991).
89. See generally Chelsea P Ferrette, E-commerce and International Political Economics: The
Legal and Political Ramifications of the Internet on World Economies, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L. 15
(2000).
90. When referring to the physical boundaries of the Internet, I am referring to the servers,
computer hardware, software, and such other materials as the fiber optic cables.
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the Internet through the application of domestic laws without regard to the glo-
bal nature of the Internet. As Professor Lessig poignantly states, "We are at a
critical time in the history of cyberspace. The space is changing before we have
learned what was special about the place."'"
At this critical time, as we are confronted with the unique challenges of reg-
ulating activity on the Internet, it is important that we reexamine the philosoph-
ical foundations of liberty, in order to avoid creating legal regimes that unduly
impair Internet activity. The massive body of scholarship covering jurisdiction
over the Internet has neglected to consider the basic philosophical underpinning
of this global force. Some commentators' cursory remarks to the idea of
"netizens" hint at a deeper matter,92 but little is mentioned of the unbridled free-
dom of the early years of the Internet. While some remember the early days of
the Internet as anarchic times when the evil of pornography was freely dis-
persed,93 others recognize something more profound. Because activity on the
Internet raises unique issues about the value of free speech, privacy, and prop-
erty, it invokes discussions of liberty begun long before the Internet or comput-
ers were ever created.
Contemporary philosophers have not discussed this notion of liberty in the
context of Internet activity. Several commentators and groups on the Internet
have discussed the term "cyberliberty" but never defined it. In order properly to
define "cyberliberty," the basic philosophic underpinning of liberty must be
examined in light of contemporary problems. Once we have done this, we can
create an informed definition of "cyberliberty" that will guide regulation of
activity on the Internet in a way that properly balances individual rights against
the regulatory power of nations.
A. Philosophical Foundations of Liberty
For generations, philosophers have debated the definition, merits, and
boundaries of liberty. The thoughts of three notable philosophers stand out:
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Stewart Mill.
91. Lessig, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm? Forward, 52 STAN. L. REV. 987, 989
(2000).
92. See, e.g., RHEINGOLD, SUpra note 36.
93. See, e.g., Protect Your Family with Filtered Internet Access!, World Christian Online, Inc., at
http://www.worldchristian.net (Apr. 9, 2003).
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Hobbes, Locke, and Mill all agree on the fundamental principle that liberty
is inherent in a state of nature. Beyond its mere existence, however, the three de-
fine liberty differently. In Leviathan, Hobbes defined liberty as "the absence of
external impediments, which impediments may oft take away part of a man's
power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left
him, according as his judgment and reason shall dictate to him."94 To Hobbes,
liberty is not complete freedom, but rather the ability to do that which an indi-
vidual has the "will, desire, or inclination to do."95 Similarly, Lockean theory
holds liberty to be the natural right to accommodate one's individual tastes to the
extent that liberty of others is not impeded.96
While similar to Hobbes and Locke in some ways, Mill describes liberty as
the absolute right of an individual to be sovereign over her own mind and body.
Further, Mill provides a three-pronged definition of liberty. First, liberty is the
freedom of thought, conscience, and the ability to express opinions on all sub-
jects. 97 Second, liberty presents the ability to formulate and follow individual
tastes and preferences even to the extent to which the individual may suffer un-
favorable consequences.98 Third, liberty is the freedom to unite to protect these
opinions, tastes, or for general protection, even at the sake of liberty itself.9
While all three authors define liberty as a method for fulfilling one's prefer-
ences, Hobbes and Locke differ slightly with Mill as to the reason liberty is im-
portant. Hobbes argues that in nature, liberty lies in the war of all against all.
"For as amongst master-less men, there is perpetual war of every man against his
neighbor."'0 0 An individual has complete freedom and can do that which is most
conducive to his desires.' But even this is not complete liberty. An individual in
a war of all against all can only do what can be successfully completed without
losing the battle to another. Individuals exchange natural liberty for civil laws
and the rule of a sovereign, because security in property and protection can be
94. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 79 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1994) (1668).
95. Id. at 136.
96. John Locke, Of Civil Government, in CLASSICS OF WESTERN THOUGHT: THE MODERN WORLD
69 (Edgar E. Knoebel ed., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Coll. Publishers 4th ed. 1988) (1690).
97. JOHN STEWART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1978)
(1859).
98. Id. at 55-57.
99. Id. at 12.
100. HOBBES, supra note 94, at 140.
101. Id.
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found only within these two constraints. 2 Within the confines established by
government, individuals find true liberty.
Locke agrees with Hobbes that societies are formed out of a desire for pro-
tection. Locke states that "there is only political society where every one of the
members has given up his natural power, surrendered it into the hands of the
community.""1 3 A political society will provide protection against the war of all
against all. Therefore, some measure of liberty must be forgone for the sake of
peace and comfort. This in turn protects the liberty to live in this peace and
comfort.
The importance of liberty to Mill has a more humanistic characteristic than
to Hobbes and Locke. Following his three-pronged approach, Mill first holds that
to prohibit freedom of thought, conscience, and expression in their entirety causes
both harm to the essence of the individual and humanity as a whole because quieted
ideas may have value and solutions for all."° Second, the ability to formulate and
follow individual tastes and preferences is necessary for the human to grow and
exist, because growth and existence can only occur through making choices.0 5
Finally, while the individual may unite with others as a form of protection, the in-
dividual maintains a sense of individuality by not being accountable for actions
that concern no one but herself. 6 Only when the individual's exercise of liberty
causes harm to others may it be limited. This is true for all forms of government.0 7
Despite their differences in definition and emphasis, Hobbes, Locke, and Mill
all place similar boundaries on liberty. While all agree that liberty extends only so
far as the sovereign and society permit, they also assert that collective control of the
individual may only be exercised in furtherance of self-preservation. "That the
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."'0 0 The
primary problem with liberty lies in where to find a "fitting adjustment between
individual independence and social control," that is, avoiding the tyranny of the
majority. 9
102. Id. at 138.
103. Locke, supra note 96, at 72.
104. MILL, supra note 97, at 50.
105. Id. at 55-57.
106. Id. at 93.
107. Id. at 109-11.
108. Id. at 9.
109. Id. at 5.
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B. Contemporary Theories of Cyberliberty, and Implications for Expression, Privacy,
and Intellectual Property
Fearful of the increasing attempts by countries to exercise jurisdiction over
the Internet, Grateful Dead writer John Perry Barlow posted on the Internet "A
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace." It stated,
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of the Mind. On
behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are
not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we
gather."'
A search of the Library of Congress catalog will reveal no titles or books
listed under the term "cyberliberty."'.. Similarly, a search of the Lexis system lo-
cates only seven entries, only one of which explicitly uses the word cyberlib-
erty."2 In that article, Steven R. Salbu defines cyberliberty as a means to aid
democracy by enabling free speech." 3 Although various sources on the Internet
use the term "cyberliberty" or "cyberliberties" in different ways'4, cyberliberty is
110. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, at http://www.eff.org/
- barlow/ declaration-final.html (Feb. 8, 1996).
111. The author conducted this search on line at http:/Acweb.loc.gov, on January 19, 2002, using
the term "cyberliberty."
112. See Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring and Supporting a New
Frontier, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429 (1998).
113.
"Cyberliberty" is another benefit of the Internet. It embodies democratic ideals
through the Internet's facilitation of openness and speech as values embraced in the
First Amendment. For example, making governmental publications widely avail-
able for downloading can strengthen our democratic system by improving access to
original documents, thereby offering an alternative to filtered information offered
by the press. Likewise, the Internet can enhance democracy by enabling "cheap
speech," liberating the "marketplace of ideas" from the institutional dominance of
publishers, distributors, broadcast media, and other traditional gate-keepers of
speech.
Id. at 436-37.
114. Compare Pete Guither, Give Me Cyberliberty, at http://www.thelivingcanvas.com/guither/
cyber.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2003), with Timothy W. Luke, Dealing with Digital Divides: The
Rough Realities of Materiality in Virtualization, paper presented at the annual meeting of the
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generally considered a matter of free expression. However, cyberliberty encom-
passes concerns about privacy and intellectual property as well.
1. Cyberliberty and Free Expression
Cyberliberty is generally considered, at least by those on the Internet, to be a
particular application of free speech rights. Ian Clark, the creator of the revolu-
tionary FreeNet program, which provides uncensorable dissemination of
controversial information and universal personal publication through a
computer-to-computer network, implicitly defines cyberliberty as the protector
of the free flow of information. His definition of cyberliberty revolves around
the basic precept that freedom of speech is "generally considered one of the most
important rights any individual might have.""' 5 In Clark's view, freedom of
expression is important for three reasons. First, communication defines human-
ity."6 The ability to communicate complex and abstract concepts separates hu-
mans from animals. Second, "knowledge is good.""..7 Greater amounts of
information improve an individual or group's ability to survive and be success-
ful. Third, democratic governments require a well-informed populace."' This is
a form of republican theory that holds that government should cultivate in
citizens "qualities of character necessary to the common good of self-
government.""' 9 Clark concludes that government should not be able to control
its population's ability to distribute information because of the importance of
this ability to the overall freedom of the individual.
General consensus too appears to support a conception of cyberliberty
predominantly as the right to free expression on the Internet. Many international
organizations cite the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Interna-
American Sociological Association, Aug. 6-10, 1999, available at http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/
tims/tim687.htm. Unlike others on the Internet, Luke equates cyberliberty with freedom in gen-
eral. Id.
115. lan Clarke, The Philosophy Behind Freenet, FREENET PROJECT, at http'/
www.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/twiki/view/main/philosophy (last visited Apr. 10, 2003).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSO-
PHY 25 (1996).
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tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a basis for this theory. 2 ° In no
place, however, is this contemporary understanding more apparent than in the
United States. For example, civil liberties groups have successfully challenged the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), which intended to limit access to pornog-
raphy by minors, and have sued library officials who have restricted access to such
Internet content.12' In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court effectively held the
CDA unconstitutional based on First and Fifth Amendment concerns.'22
2. Cyberliberty and Privacy
Other advocates of Internet liberty, such as the Global Internet Liberty
Campaign (GILC), extend cyberliberty beyond protection of free speech to pro-
tection against invasion of privacy. GILC argues that cyberliberty covers four
areas beyond free speech.'23 First, it advocates freedom from over-regulation of
technologies related to Internet transmissions.'24 Next, GILC strives to ensure
that personal information generated for one purpose is not used for alternative
purposes.'25 Further, it argues for protecting private information and preventing
restrictions on encryption.'26 Finally, GILC advocates the right to anonymity on-
line to ward off potential violations of human rights and to remove fears of
retribution.'
27
120. International Bill of Human Rights: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A (III), U.N. GOAR, art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/810 19 (1948) ("Everyone has the right to freedom
of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of fron-
tiers."); International Bill of Human Rights: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 19 U.N. Doc A/XXI (1966)
("Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.").
121. Courtney Macavinta, Civil Liberties On-Line: The Year That Was, NEWS.coM, at http'//
news.com.com/2100-1023-219588.html (Dec. 30, 1998).
122. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
123. Member Statement on "Impact of Self-Regulation and Filtering on Human Rights to Freedom of
Expression, GLOBAL INTERNET LIBERTY CAMPAIGN, at http'//www.gilc.orgJspeech/ratings/gilc-
oecd-398.html (Mar. 25, 1998).
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3. Cyberliberty and Intellectual Property
In general, intellectual property law recognizes property rights in the intan-
gible products created by the human mind. Influential legal scholars of Internet
and government regulation focus on the Internet as a necessary medium to en-
courage this type of creativity.28 While some may argue that this is nothing more
than a free speech issue, the Internet as a creative medium presents a distin-
guishable regulatory dilemma.
Never before has there been a medium that allows us to try out different
"and even heretical" ideas free of socioeconomic conditions, and receive feed-
back to our creativity immediately from all corners of the world. 129 While there
is little doubt that Gutenberg's printing press fundamentally changed education
and public discourse, the Internet is unparalleled in its ability to do all of this
more efficiently, more economically, free of ordinary politics, and "free to de-
velop, to work ideas out, without apology." ' The very nature and structure of
the Internet makes this medium extraordinarily capable of infusing creativity
into a global society. The creativity occurring in this medium and the ability to
use the Internet as a means of transferring creative works gives rise to an impor-
tant regulatory interest of all governments: protecting intellectual property
rights (IP rights).
While IP rights have been examined extensively in the literature, several re-
cent events are worth mentioning. First, some deem the Internet to be the death
of copyright. Ginsburg notes some of the problems with enforcing copyrights:
Should one look to the country where copies were (first) received?
To the country from which the author uploaded the work? To the
country in which is localized the website from which the work
first becomes available to the public? What are the consequences
of these different characterizations of publication and country of
origin? 31
While the Internet can be used to infringe or even rob copyright owners of
the benefits of copyright, the Internet has also been used to prevent the grant of
128. Lawrence Lessig, TheDeath of Cyberspace, 57 WASH & LEE L. REV. 337, 342 (2000).
129. Lessig, supra note 91, at 999.
130. Id.; see also Lessig, supra note 128, at 342.
131. Ginsburg, supra note 45, at 255.
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a patent. For example, the Human Genome Project recently posted its map of
the human genome on the Internet with the intention of maintaining that infor-
mation as public knowledge and barring Celera Genomics, 13 2 a private company,
from obtaining patent rights on the human genome 33 This race to prohibit
Celera from obtaining the patent caused the loss of a very valuable commodity in
the patent, albeit in the name of science. From these examples, it is clear that pre-
scriptive jurisdiction over the Internet-especially over intellectual property on
the Internet-is indeed very valuable.
C. Cyberliberty Defined
Drawing on the philosophic foundations of liberty and contemporary notions
of Internet freedom, we can define cyberliberty as the freedom, while on the
Internet, from all external constraints on expression, privacy, and property, except
constraints imposed by the state of which an individual or entity is a national.
1. Freedom, While on the Internet, from All External Constraints on
Expression, Privacy, and Property
The substantive clause of the definition originates primarily in Hobbesian
and Lockean philosophy. The Internet is very much like the original state of na-
ture. Before mankind divided the earth into territorialized states, no govern-
ment existed and it was a "war of all against all." The individual could act in
accordance with individual tastes and preference, concerned with other individ-
uals only to the extent necessary for survival. Locke differs from Hobbes in that
he believes that reason exists in the state of nature and therefore that individual
actions are naturally restrained. The origin-and perhaps some would argue
the current state-of the Internet strongly resembles Hobbes's conceptualiza-
tion of the state of nature and rejects Locke's belief in reason. When the Internet
first became available, no expression, privacy, or property was barred. The Inter-
net by its very nature was free from constraints.
132. The Maverick: Craig Venter, BBC NEWS, May 30, 2000, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
indepth/ scitech/2000/humangenome/760685.stm.
133. National Human Genome Research Institute, The Human Genome Project, at http://
www.genome.gov/page.cfm ? pageid =10001694.
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Now, as nations attempt to regulate the Internet, it is important to retain
much of the original integrity of the Internet and its ideals with cyberliberty.
Mill's theory of the importance of liberty justifies the maintenance of cyber-
liberty. Cyberliberty protects free expression because prohibiting it would harm
the essence of the individual and humanity as a whole. Also, the ability to formu-
late creative ideas and express one's preferences enables humans to grow and
flourish. Finally, liberty on the Internet ensures a forum wherein disenfran-
chised actors can have a voice in globalization.
2. Except Constraints Imposed by the State of Which an Individual or Entity Is
a National
Cyberliberty is not without limits. The individual must sacrifice some mea-
sure of natural liberty for the protection and security afforded by governance. 34 In
today's world, all territories have been divided into a system of nation-states. Sov-
ereignty is and always has been the very backbone of this modern state system.
In his seminal work,A Modern Law of Nations, Philip C. Jessup defined classic
sovereignty as the "ultimate freedom of national will unrestricted by law.'
3 5
States are the ultimate source of rights, duties, and liberties under international
law. Sovereign independence permits individual societies to affirm and develop
their own values. The cost of societal regulations for communities and individuals
must be determined by their own governments. Extranational regulations affect
sovereignty by making it impossible for communities to establish independent
identities. 136
To allow one nation or all nations to regulate foreign citizens or activities
within other nations violates sovereignty, except, as stated in Part I, when there is
a basis for regulation, such as an effect in the second jurisdiction. 137 As one com-
mentator stated, "The plurality of norms, ideas, customs, and politics within the
134. See MILL, supra note 97. This is an extension of Mill's attempt to balance the "tyranny of the
majority" with the ability to take actions that do not impeded others liberty in some way. See also
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 504 (George Lawrence trans., J.P. Mayer ed.,
HarperCollins Publishers 1969) (1966).
135. JEssUP,supra note 29, at I.
136. But see Declan McCullagh, Silencing the Net: The Threat to Freedom of Expression On-line,
May 1996, at http://www.epic.org/free-speech/intl/hrw-report-5_96.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2003).
137. Seesupra Part I.B.2.
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Internet community itself escapes regulation by a single entity or acquiescence to
a single jurisdiction."'38 Therefore, constraints on cyberliberty may only be
applied by states to members of their own community.
Regarding prescriptive jurisdiction, the above definition of cyberliberty is
consistent with the nationality principle, but inconsistent with the objective ter-
ritoriality principle. I would argue, rather, that the objective territoriality prin-
ciple is inconsistent with cyberliberty. As Hobbes stated, natural liberty is the
war of all against all. An individual chooses to give up some of his liberty in
order to have protection from such strife. However, this liberty is only given to a
specific sovereign, and the individual is only bound by a sovereign when he or
she covenants with consent. Hobbes states, "Man in absolute liberty cannot be
expected to recognize two opposing representatives of individual authority."'39
Furthermore, man can only be a citizen under one sovereign. A competing
sovereign places all men in a state of war, the very thing man gives up absolute
liberty to avoid. 4 ° Objective territoriality allows a sovereign to which an indi-
vidual has not given up power to exercise laws to the detriment of the individ-
ual's liberty. This sovereign grants no protection in exchange for liberty, and the
individual cannot choose to disobey its commands. The individual is bound
without consent and therefore completely loses liberty. Under a proper sover-
eign, an individual only loses a portion of liberty, not all liberty. At the very min-
imum, the individual who consents still has the freedom to chose to remain
under the sovereign or leave.
D. The Definition of Cyberliberty Applied
Unfortunately for both Yahoo! and CompuServe, the new definition of
cyberliberty would not free these corporations from the jurisdiction of France or
Germany. Both companies had subsidiaries located within and under the law of
the host state. In both cases, these subsidiaries would have been entities falling
within national regulation, although the parent companies would not.
This does not mean, however, that all individuals would suffer the fate of
Yahoo! and CompuServe. The new definition of cyberliberty would free non-
French and non-German individuals from the constraints of both French and
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German regulations. For example, an artist located in Brazil would not have to
fear liability for posting her painting of purple tractors on her website, as long as
such a display is not illegal in the her home state. This does not mean that the
painting could be viewed legally in France if France prohibits such artwork,
merely that the artist would escape the jurisdictional reach of France and would
not fear prosecution in French courts simply because the website is available in
France. In short, non-French individuals would not be subject to liability for ma-
terial that violates French regulations and is passively posted on websites or
through networks.
The application of this definition of cyberliberty would have many benefits
not found under the current use of the objective territoriality principle. First, ap-
plication of this definition would increase certainty. Individuals could post in-
formation on the Internet, good or bad, to the benefit of creativity and
advancement of knowledge and technology. Furthermore, individuals could
carefully structure websites to avoid those countries which had policies or laws
stifling the exchange of information on the Internet.
Second, the exchange of information allows for the expression and repre-
sentation of cultural differences. Nations would be prohibited from stopping the
exchange of information for all end users simply as a means of enforcing their
own laws with respect to one small group of citizens.
Third, cyberliberty allows nations to regulate the Internet while increasing
certainty in this regulation. Although this does not allow the complete regula-
tion of the Internet, it does allow nations to govern their citizens. For instance,
the Republic of China could continue censoring the Internet that flows into
China. This ability to maintain some form of regulation properly balances
against the inability to control the entire Internet. Citizens of other nations need
only follow the laws of their own nations without fear of liability in others.
Finally, on an economic level, the certainty and freedom provided by this
definition would reduce the economic costs of Internet services, thereby increas-
ing access to the Internet. The sum of these benefits would aid the use of the
Internet and promote its role as a key agent in globalization.
SAMUEL F. MILLER
CONCLUSION
Machiavelli believed that there "was no reliable way to hold onto a city...
short of demolishing the city itself.'.' Conquering the Internet is much like con-
quering Machiavelli's theoretical city. The Internet as we now know it has only
existed in a workable fashion for a little over a decade. As the Internet has ma-
tured, states have attempted to regulate and conquer this territory-less space
through various international jurisdictional principles. In doing so, states have
threatened freedom of expression, commerce, and action. But, the Internet is an
important agent of globalization and must be free to expand as a neutral zone.
The need to expand the role of the Internet must be balanced with the sovereign
right of nations over their citizens.
The definition of cyberliberty asserted here will not satisfy some and poten-
tially flies in the face of the current attempts to regulate the Internet, especially
under the objective territoriality principle. Fully realizing that the objective ter-
ritoriality principle continues to grow in use, the definition seeks to restore the
lost notion of nationality into the debate over Internet jurisdiction. As witnessed
by the problems surrounding the territoriality principles and the benefits of the
nationality approach, nationality must be included as an integral factor of con-
sideration, if not a truly viable option on its own.
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